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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEONARD J. HUDSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
FLOYD We DECKER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Brief of Appellant 
RICHARD W. BRANN & DEAN N. CLAYTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
406 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah 
***************** 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
hereinafter called Plaintiff, from a judgment for 
Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter called Defendant, 
on a jury verdict directed by the Honorable Parley 
Eo Norseth, District Judge, on the 24th day of 
January, 1957, in the District Court of the Second 
, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
Judicial District, Weber County, Utah~ Since the 
record on appeal is in two parts, Plaintiff will 
hereinafter refer to the transcript of evidence 
as (T) and the balance of the record as (R)e 
At the close of Plaintiff's case in chief, 
Defendant moved the Court for a directed v~t 
(T. 86, 87), and the Court took the motion under 
advisement until the afternoon session. The record 
does not show, but the writer is confident Defendant 
will admit, that Defendant also rested and advised 
the Court in chambers that no further evidence would 
be offered on behalf of Defendant. Since the facts 
adduced in the record are undisputed, the question 
of whether Defendant also rested is important only 
in that possibly, if not probably, the\facts could 
in no way be explained, varied or controverted by 
Defendant. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was 
denied by the Court on February 11, 1957. 
Plaintiff and Defendant, employees of Ut' So 
Hill Air Force Base, were temporarily assigned to 
Larsen Air Force Base, MOses Lake, Washington, for 
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one month's duty extending from May 17~ 1955~ to 
J 17 1955 (T 5 '9 60 61 ) Defendant desired une , . e . , ~ , , ..... ., 
comp.:tny for the return trip to the partiet~v rE.sidsnce·3 
in Utah and requested Plaintiff to ride 1111i th him 
(To 6l)o On June l7, 1955:; Plaintiff and Defendant.)) 
in Defendant Y s 1950 Plymouth sedan~ drove from Ivf..ose.:; 
Lake, Washington, to Spokane, \iashington, lodged 
overnight and then, about 5~00 o<Jclock .AoMejl tTune 18, 
1955, connnenced driving from Spokane, Washington.., to 
the place of the accident complained of by Plaintiff 
(Te 49-52)o Defendant drove and Plaintiff 1~lC-L~ a. non-
paying guest passenger (To50, 61)., 
-
On ~rune 18~ 1955, about 1~00 o<Jc2.ock PoMo)l the 
partief! had arrived at a point a.pproxima tely 44 miles 
north of Salmon City, Idaho, and a,pproxLrnately 2 miles 
soutb of the Summit of Lost Trail Pa:;,s, on Uo So 
Highway 93, within Lemhi County, Idaho (T., 44~ 5l)o 
T:te highway was paved and dry, visibility 1.rua.s clear· 
and ·weather good, and the t.~~~:rair._ 111BS w .. m.rrrt.a,inou:s 
with moderate curving of the bighv.Jay (Te 6., 67, PJ..si.n-
ti.ff·.'s EL1.ibits C, D a,nd E)., The Defendant drc·ve 
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his automobile south from the summit of Lost Trail 
Pass at a speed between 30-40 miles per hour (Te 51), 
about 2 miles south of the pass Defendant started to 
slow down rounding a curve (Te 53), slowed down to 
ttnot over ten miles an hour" on the second curve 
(Te 54), continued to slow down to 5-10 miles an 
hour (To 54) and then drove off the highl~Y into a 
ravine bordering the highway (T. 54, Plaintiff~s 
Exhibits C, E and F). Plaintiff's Exhibits B, F and 
G show the condition of DefendantVs automobile after 
it landed in the ravine. 
Plaintiff's witnesses Harmon W~ Cheney, Jame:s 
Larsen and David Burt returning from Moses lake, 
Washington, in Mr. larsen's automobile, s,aw tracks 
running off the highway and then sa·1/{ Defendant <J s 
automobile below (T. 6, ?). David Burt took the 
photographs in evidence (To 11). Harmon Cheney 
testified that in the immediate vicinity of where 
Defendant's automobile went off the highway there was 
a 1'thin coat n of loose sanrl or fine gravel on the 
paved highway (Te 21, 28), but that he was travelling 
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at 40 rr~les per hour in the right lane at this point 
and had no difficulty whatsoever in negotiating the 
curve (To 26, 27, 28)o 
Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, including 
a fractured vertebrae and right femur, and incurred 
considerable medical expenses as a result of the acci~ 
dent (T~ 7o-8l)o The medical testL~ony of Dro Louis 
SQ Peery is omitted from the record (Re 13)~ Since 
there is little chance of dispute as to Plaintiff·;s 
receiving more than nominal personal injuries as a 
result of the accident, the Plaintiff will confine 
himself primarily to talking about the evidence 
necessary to raise a question of fact on the issue 
of reckless disregardo 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT Io 
The Court erred in sustaining Defendant!s motion 
·~for a directed verdict and directing a verdict in 
favor of Defendant and aga.i.nE:t Plaintiff upon tbe 
ground and for the reason that. the undisputed evidence 
in this cause was sufficient to raise a jury questionn 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for Defendant 
on a directed verdict~ Only Plaintiff offered 
evidence in this case and such evidence is undisputedo 
The rule is established in this state, that upon 
Plaintiff's appeal from a judgment for Defendant on 
a directed ~ct, this Court will consider and 
apply the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff's cause of 'action and every controverted 
fact shall be resolved in Plaintiff's favor, Ae W. 
Sewell v. Commercial Cas. Coo, 80 Utah 378, 15 Po 2d 
327; Jackson Vo Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 Po 2d 566; 
Boskovich Vo Utah Const. Co., Utah --~:' 259 
Po 2d 885, 886. The question here resolves itself 
into one of whether, after considering the evidence 
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it would be 
unreasonable to find in favor of Plaintiff under the 
pleadingso Winchester v. Egan Farm Service, 4 Utah 2d 
129, 288 Po 2d 790o Stated another way, 
"· o o if by admitting for the purposes 
of the motion all facts which the evidence, 
given a reasonable construction in favor of 
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the adverse party, tends to support or prove, 
it_ appears ,that all essential:- facts are 
supported by evidence with respect to which 
reasonable men may arrive at different con= 
elusions, or the evidence is such that 
reasonable minds may draw different inferences, 
the motion should be denied and the case 
submitted to the jurye n 53 Am. Juro, Trial, 
Sec. 362; Accord: 61 CoJoSo Motor Vehicles, 
Sec. 526. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are directly 
descended from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
although they contain a few modifications to suit 
local practice. Rule 50 (b), UoRoCoPo, provides, 
in substance, that whenever a motion for a directed 
verdict is made at the close of the evidence and 
denied for any reason, the trial court is deemed to 
have submitted the cause to the jury subject to a 
later determination of the legal questions involved. 
The U. S. Circuit Court in Fratta Vo Grace Line 
:;..ci 
(C.C.Ao2d) 139 Fed.~743, 744, admirably states the 
text authority and Federal view of the intent and 
purpose of Rule 50 (b): 
'~e take this occasion to suggest to 
trial judges that, generally speaking--
although there may be exceptions--it is 
desirable not to direct a verdict at the 
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close of the evidence, but to reserve 
decision on any motion therefor, and to 
allow the jury to bring in a verdict; the 
trial judge may then, if he thinks it 
improper, set aside the verdict as against 
the weight of the evidence and grant the 
motion, F.RoC.P., Rule 50 (b) o o o with 
the consequence that if, on appeal, we 
disagree with him, we will be in a position 
to reinstate the verdict, thus avoiding the 
waste and expense of another trial.,tt See 
also: I~ss v. Pa. R. Co., 68 F., Suppo 740' 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and ' 
Procedure, Sec. 1076. 
Few things are more devastating to a trial lawyer 
than a directed verdict. A jury verdict of no cause 
of action can be explained to a client as the con-
elusion of eight reasonable persons of ordinary and 
varying experience. A directed verdict is the 
conclusion of one person resulting from his attitudes 
and experience alone. Ordinarily, if a case is slim 
on questions of law or liability, a jury verdict of 
no cause of action kills the litigation for everyone 
concerned. A directed verdict usually requires an 
appeal and, if the trial court was wrong, another 
trial resulting in double expense to litigants and 
the State and possible loss to PlaintiffVs cause by 
lapse of time and loss of evidenceo Ofttimes 1 
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verdicts are directed in the heat of the trial and 
under pressureo If the issues be submitted to the 
jury and then retained under advisement by the Court 
for ten days, then surely there is time for calm and 
dispassionate consideration and evaluation of the 
record and the law, presumably giving rise to far less 
chance of error and possibly cutting down the number 
of appeals and retrialso Rule 50 (b), UoRoCoPo, was 
drawn in the light of such considerations" · 
Plaintiff's complaint alleged and the evidence 
showed that Plaintiff was injured in the State of 
Idaho while being transported by Defendant as a guest 
(Ro l)o The Idaho nguest statute," Seco 49-1001, 
Idaho Code was pleaded and reads as follows: 
''No person transported. by the o·wner or 
operator of a motor vehicle as his guest 
without payment for such transportation 
shall have a cause for damages against 
such owner or operator for injuries, death 
or loss, in case of accident, unless such 
accident shall have been intentional on 
the part of the said owner or operator or 
caused by his intoxication or his reckless 
d_jisregard of the rights of otherso tt 
After much confusion, the Idaho Supreme Court 
crystallized a definition of "reckless disregardn as 
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follows~ 
'~he term 'reckless disregard' as used 
in said section means an act or conduct 
destitute of heed or concern for conse-
quences; especially foolishly heedless of 
danger, headlong rash; wanton disregard, or 
conscious indifference to consequenceson 
~ Foberg Vo Harrison, 71 Idaho 11, 225 Po 2d 
V),69 71; Turner Vo Purdum, (Idaho), 289 Po 
2d,608, 6ll,)and see other cases cited 
thereino ~ __ 
This Court, in Shoemaker Vo Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217 
P. 2d 382, recognized the Idaho view that reckless 
means '~o hold the driver liable for a lesser degree 
of negligence than an 'intentional! actn and in said 
case this Court cited with approval Hughes Vo Hudelson, 
67 Idaho 10, 169 P. 2d 712, which reversed a nonsuit 
and held the evidence sufficient to make a prima 
facie case. In the Hughes case, supra, proof of a 
45 mile speed together with physical facts showing 
the host to have driven his vehicle partially on a 
soft shoulder 360 feet before returning to the 
highway and overturning, thereby killing the guef't, 
"constitute sufficient proof to make a prima facie 
case to put the Defendant on hi,s prooflllo 
The only issue in this ca8e at the bar is 
10 
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whether-Plaintiff's undisputed evidence was sufficient 
to go to the jury for·determination of the ultimate 
issues raised by the pleadings., What constitutes 
reckless.disregard is a question of fact, each case 
standing to. a large extent on its own bottom and, 
therefore, decided cases being of little aid in o<: 
resolving the questiono Von Lackum Vo Allan, 219 / 
F o 2d 937, 938o Plaintiffts evidence of ''reckless 
disregard n is· undisputed, but almost wholly circum-
stantialo However, as noted in 20 Amo Juro, Evidence, 
Seco 11$9, "In many instances facts can be proved 
only by circumstantial eviQ.ence, and in some instances 
even though . there is direct testimony, the circum-
stantial evidence given may outweigh, or be more 
convincing than direct or positive testimonyott 
MCCormick, Law of Evidence (1954), Seco 306, 
discusse.s. burden of producing evidence in a clear and 
sound rnannero He points out that in the usuaJl civil 
case, the Plaintiff passes through three stages of 
judicial hospitality: (1) where if Plaintiff stops, 
he will be thrown out of Court; (2) where if Plaintiff 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'!frl 
,/ 
stops and Defendant does nothing !J the issues are 
submitted to the jury' and (3) where if Plaintiff 
stops and Defendant does nothing, a verdict. will be 
directed in Plaintiff\?s favor" Strictly speaking, 
the burden of going forward does not shift until 
':;tage three since Defendant can refuse to go forward 
and yet not suffer a directed verdict~ until stage 
threeo It is PL?.intifftis contention in this case 
tb..at Plaintiff clearly arrived safely at stage two, 
although there may be room for argument as to whether 
Plaintiff arrived at stage three, PLa..intiff vigorous= 
ly ~.s::'erts that a reasonable jury could infer the 
fact of Defendant 11 s ''reckl.e:ss disregard n from the 
undisputed evidence presentedo 
The Defendant, as an adverse witness, testified. 
that he drove his automobile from the s-ummi.t of LoRt 
Trail Pass at a speed between 30~40 miles per hour 
(Te 53 )P that he slowed do·wn tn "not ove!'' ten mile;:-; 
an hour-n rounding the curve immediately preceding tt.& 
modeet curve on which the acciden-t occurred (Te 5.3),. 
that he continued to sl::~~~~~· dmllln to 5-10 mi.le•-:: per hour 
12 
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{To 54) and that he then drove off the b.ighway into 
tt:e deep ravine below {To 54, Plaintiffvs Exbibits C, 
D, E and F)o No reason or explanation wa.s at any 
time given by Defendant as to w.hy h~, drove off the 
high"w:s,y a 
At the pl9.ce where Defendant dr~ove hi~ automobile 
off the highway, the weather was good and visibil.i ty 
clear~ and the highway 1r1as paved and dry (To 6, 67, 
Pl7bi.ntiff t~ s Exh..ibi V:: C, D and E) o Plaintiff 11 s 
Exhibit.::. C, D and E clearly show that the curve at 
this point was considerably lesE: th.3.n severeo True, 
there 141as a thin coat of sand or grC~,vel on the h.igh~~ 
way, but this did not interf8re 1dt.h tl:e negotiation 
of this curve at forty miles per .hour by Pl.~3.intiff Yis 
witnes~ Harmon Cheney a few minutes after Defenda,nt 
drove off the highway (To 2.1., 2:.61} 27 ~ 28)o In any 
case, there is not a scintillh o.f evidence in tb.i~:'. 
case tha.t such sand or gravt:,1 .ir~terfex-,ed 1ffd.th 
De-fendant <J,s operation of his autorrJC·b:l.le or tha,t there 
l~E:..s any other intervening agency that c.8,used. De~fendant 
to drive off the hi.ghw.s.y..., 
13 
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Ordinarily in a gue,,e;t c~:::,:::e, the PLaintiff i::J 
cL~iming excessive speed.., In thE- ca:2e &t the bar~, 
Plij,intiff dos<::- not claim ex.ce<~f'.i.ve ~pe6d" but t.h3,t~ 
according to Defendant·~":' te~t.imony, ~he speed w.a.s o=·o 
~modest that only intentioru:ll Dr reckle~::; di . ::rrega.rd 
could. h-ave brough a.:Qout this accidente There is 
abe.olutely no evidence of an intervening agency 
bringing about the drivi~f the bighway. Th& 
Idaho ~aee ~on v. Mootz. 253 P~the . • tJ{ 
Utb.h ca.seSI Riccuiti Vo Rob?nm, 2 Utah 2d. 45:; 269 
P" 2d 282, bot.h argued vigorously to the trial court 
by Ddfend.ant, do not have any r·el.ev:s.nee or applica~ 
tion to this case at thB bc:~r be~au:::;e both inYolve 
inte.r·vening a,gencies, ::J, horse in the first case and 
or the driver looking fc!" &..n infl:6ct ~or cig,;trette ar"e 
.sJl instance1:1 of intervening ag6ncie:3 t 1-·2-t expl~in 
awc;~,y what otherwise might b~ intentional conduct. or 
reckless dis:r-ega,rd.., In the i.n&tant case, it. is 
again emphasized that there i~; no evidence ·wh~,t~-.ce.v6:r 
14 
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of a.n intervening agency gi·vi.ng rise to an explanation 
of why Defendant drove off the hi.gh"lllray ::J.t the time 
and place alleged by Pla.intiff" 
The case of Hebert v"' Allen, (Io·wa) 4l NcWo 2d 
240, sums up Plaintiff~s position in. this ca3e~ In 
the Hebert case, Defendant was travelling 1.5~20 miles 
per hour on a straight road and suddenly"q lAlithout 
lmown reason, swerved from the highway into a telephone 
pole, thereby injuring Pls.i.ntiff llllho wa.~ riding on the 
.5''1 
fend.ero The Iowa. Supreme Court reversed a directed 
verdict and, among other things, said~ 
"But though the doctrine of rr::.s ipsa may 
not apply, it was not for the court to 
imagine possible explanr.:ttions other than 
the obvious one of reck.les,sness:o The day 
was clear and bright, there w~s no other 
vehicle in sight, the terrain 1rr~.s flat, 
there is no evidence of any unusual :Street 
condition, the car was apparently under the 
driveris complete control a m.~tter of seconds 
before the "accident,n no dive::-ting circum~ 
stances are shownc When the car started to 
swerve one of the passengers said to the 
other nHe is probably trying to sc.s.re uso n 
That was the natural explanation that came 
to the mind of one 'Wi tnGsi~~ a~' ::'1 part of the 
reE' gestaeo It is a reasonable one under 
this Recordo As ·was said in ~ite y, Center, 
supra, 218 Iowa, at p~ge 1033, 254 N~Wo at 
page 92g 1tl,ve have no eviden~-s on the part 
15 
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of the Defendant, and, if w·e are to indulge 
the imagination and conjure posc.:ibiJities 9 
there is practically no limit to wruch we 
may not goe ~f- -r.- ~~ If, before the Plaintiff 
can rre,ke out a case, he must negative every 
pos.sibili ty ·lArbich might relieve the Defendant. 
from liability, it would be practically 
impoE:sible to establish a case of negligence 
or recklessness against the driver of any 
automobileo Surelyjl this is not the laY~ro 
111N either court nor jury has any ·way to 
learn the mental attitude of the drive:t" 
except by inference from his conducto As 
.~1,id in Mescher Ve Brogan, 223 Iowa 573, 581, 
272 NoWo 645, 650~ nrt is the action and 
conduct ~- ~~- * that measure the degree of 
care and determines ·whether or not one i'3 
proce'~ding ~*" * ~r with a heedless d.is.regard 
for * * * the rights of other sou 
nnefendants would have us hold there 
wa'3 no e·vidence here as to the driver~s 
"actions and conduct n from which an 
inference of recklessneE:3 could be dra;11\lno 
This we cannot doe The movement of the 
car, under the Record presented 'I ·rAlcUB some 
evidenc~ of the conduct of the drivero This 
is not to say ttres ipsa loquitur on It would 
be just as true if the ca,r had ne:ver struck 
the pole-if there had been no ".:tccidentett 
r~e have said that while no presumption 
of negligence arises from the mere fact of 
injury, nsuch presumption mSty and often does 
arise from the nature of the cause or ms.nner 
0f the injuryo" Cahill Vo Illinq:i,s Central 
Ro Coo, 148 Io·wa 241, .246, 125 No1rlo 331, 332, 
28 LoRo.Ao jl N oSo J llLJ_o 
UThe statute creates liability for 
injury due to "reckless operation" of the 
caro Certainly the jury cou.ld r..ave found. 
unde:!" this Record that the car was being 
16 
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operat~q by Defendant Hildebrand.o ~.nd whether 
such operation was reckless was clearly a 
jury questiono 
uwe b,ave e.x;amined all the cases cited by 
Defendant in support of the court vs rulingo 
Our deci.~ion here does not run counter to the 
ruling in any of theme n 
JL'1.other case in point is Doheny v.., Coverdale, 
(Monte) 68 Po 2d 142, where the guests ·were killed 
and only circumstantial evidence ·was available 
indicating the automobile was driven off the road 
into a tree "Vl.ri.thout reason showing, The Court held 
the circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a 
jury question on the issue of gross negligence and 
reckles3 operationo Also see-Thom~son Vo Kost (Kyo) 
~ 
194 SoWo .2d 976-, Orico Vc Williams., (Conno) 97 -Ao 2d 
556. ~-+.rr0....._ 
.Assume, for purpose of discussion only, that 
Defendant did in fact consciously and intentionally 
drive his automobile off the embankment in this caseo 
What further proof could Plaintiff produ~e o.f such 
intentional conduct in this case? Presu.mabJ..y, on a. 
direct quee.tion, Defendant would empha tico.lly deny 
such intent.ional conduct, yet the denial -would not 
17 
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change the ultimate fact~ Who; besides the Defendantj 
on this earth can possibly know the mental workings 
of Defendant vs mind at the time he drove off the 
embankmento As a practical matter, reaso~~ble men 
must determine a man v s intent from all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the incident in questiono 
If the facts point in one direction, then the burden 
should shift to the Defendant to sho·w additional facts 
pointing in another direction. Psychiatrists have long 
recognized that more than a few automobile accidents 
are intentional in that they are the result of con-
scious or subconscious feelings of aggression, guilt 
or self~estructiono The question, as in this case, 
is how far an injured claimant must go in proving such 
intentional conduct by circumstances in order to 
raise a jury question~ 
There is no dispute in the evidence regarding 
Plaintiffts severe injuries, including a. fractured 
vertebrae and right femur, and extensive medical 
treatment and hospitalization (To 70-81 incG) and 
medical expenses exceeding $1,000o00 (Pl=Lint.iff~s 
18 
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Exhibits A and H)e Little more need be said on 
Plaintiff's medicals since the Court directed its 
verdict for failure of proof on the issue of 
reckless disregard (To 88, 89)o 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury 
on the issue of Defendant's "reckless disregard" 
where the undisputed evidence showed Defendant drove 
his automobile off the highway into a deep ravine 
below, without explanation or reason given, while 
operating his automobile at a speed reduced from 
35-40 miles per hour to 5-10 miles per hour on a 
dry paved highway with visibility good and only a 
modest curve at the point of leaving the highwayo 
Respectfully submitted., 
Richard W. Brann 
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